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INTRODUCTION
The right to the free exercise of religion is one of the first free-
doms the First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects.' The Free Exercise Clause2 reflects the Framers' sensitivity to
the threat of governmental interference with the beliefs and practices
of religious minorities.3 A critical virtue of this constitutional right is
the extent to which it grants religious believers exemptions from stat-
utes that impose burdens on their free exercise of religion.4 These
exemptions protect the religious liberty of people who profess faith in
small or unpopular religions.5 For example, constitutional free exer-
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally BARRY LYNN ET AL., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d ed. 1995) (giving guidance to the right to
free exercise); TE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION & THE BILL OF RIGHTS (James E. Wood, Jr.
ed., 1990) [hereinafter THE FIRST FREEDOM] (collection of works) (organizing several arti-
cles discussing the importance of the free exercise of religion).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exer-
cise [of religion] . . ").
3 See Douglas Laycock, Original Intent and the Constitution Today, in THE FIRST FREE-
DOM, supra note 1, at 87, 106 ("The memory of serious religious conflict was more recent to
the founders than the memory of slavery is to us, and minor persecutions continued into
their political lifetimes."); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RESOURCE CTR., LAw, RELIGION AND
THE "SEcuLRt" STATE 103 (1991) (remarks of Michael W. McConnell) ("Religious accom-
modations, almost without exception, involve religious minorities of one sort or an-
other."). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HAv. L. REV. 1409, 1421-71 (1990) (describing the historical under-
pinnings of the Free Exercise Clause and the important role toleration of diverse religious
beliefs played in the development of free exercise provisions in the constitutions of the
original states and in the First Amendment).
4 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1418 (describing the "no-exemptions view" of the
Free Exercise Clause, which contends that the clause exists "to prevent the government
from singling out religious practice for peculiar disability," and the "exemptions view" that
the clause serves to "[protect] religious practices against even the incidental or unintended
effects of government action").
5 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 106 ("The religion clauses are designed in part to
protect these unusually fervent believers .... Religious minorities need not be reasonable;
the religion clauses exist in part because religious minorities are not reasonable."); see also
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 59-68 (1991) (describ-
ing instances of past persecutions of religious groups, including Quakers, Catholics,
Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses, and those contemporary religious groups, such as be-
lievers in Santeria, Hare Krishnas, Scientologists, and other groups loosely labeled cults,
who face persecution for their beliefs and whose religious freedom, he argues, the Free
Exercise Clause should protect).
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cise provisions permit members of the Old Order Amish faith exemp-
tion from mandatory public school attendance laws that required
enrollment beyond the eighth grade and avoidance of traffic laws that
required them to mount a gaudy orange triangle on their buggies be-
cause both laws conflict with their religious beliefs.6 Rastafarians and
Mohawks, who attach important religious significance to hair length
and style, have constitutional exemption from hair-length regulations
for prisoners and prison guards that conflict with their religious be-
liefs.7 Also, Athabascans are exempt from Alaskan hunting laws when
they kill moose for use in traditional religious burial services. 8 The
availability of these exemptions has been an important component of
the right to religious liberty.9
When the majority passes laws that conflict with religious minori-
ties' free exercise of religion, it threatens repression and persecution
of the minority religions, even if the conflict is unintentional. 10 This
threat to religious minorities motivated the framers of the early colo-
nial charters and state constitutions to include clauses protecting the
free exercise of religion." These framers were probably familiar with
the proposition that individuals who invoke their free exercise rights
should be exempt from generally applicable laws.' 2
Unlike in the colonial period, when the Federal Bill of Rights and
the New York Constitution were drafted, religious freedom for minor-
ity religions is no longer a matter of critical concern for most people
6 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (exempting the Amish from
mandatory public school attendance after graduation from the eighth grade); State v.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 395-97 (Minn. 1990) (exempting the Amish from mounting
orange triangles on their buggies and instead permitting the use of white reflective tape);
State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Wis. 1996) (same).
7 See Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 575-77 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting Ras-
tafarian prisoners to keep their dreadlocks in contravention of prison rules); Francis v.
Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying prison officials' motion for sum-
mary judgment and allowing Rastafarian prison guards an exemption from correctional
services hair-length regulations); Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (App. Div. 1994) (exempting a prison guard who belonged to the
Longhouse religion from cutting his hair in spite of correctional services hair-length regu-
lations based on the New York Constitution's free exercise clause).
8 See Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
9 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 106-07 (arguing that the history of religious persecu-
tion and early controversies over conscientious objection to oath taking, military conscrip-
tion, and payment of religious taxes inform the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause).
10 See Laycock, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that even "facially neutral" laws will yield
"religious oppression").
1 See IsAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 31 (1997)
("The absence of religious tests would, the New York constitution claimed, 'guard against
the spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and
wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind.'"); Laycock, supra note 3, at 106-08;
McConnell, supra note 3, at 1424-30.
12 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1511.
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in the United States.'8 But, like the Baptists, Quakers, Lutherans, and
Presbyterians of the colonial era,14 those individuals and groups
whose religious beliefs and practices leave them outside the main-
stream of contemporary American religious and political society bene-
fit from the rights free exercise clauses afford. Free exercise of
religion claims continue to be relatively common.' 5 Many involve
prisoners, and most involve minority religions that lack the political
clout to protect their practices from the democratic majority, which
often enacts generally applicable laws that conflict with those
practices. 16
Recent free exercise claims in New York courts include Muslim
prisoners' claims that prohibitions on prayer in the prison yards in-
fringed their religious duty to pray five times a day,17 an Amish man's
claim that a state requirement to photograph him for a pistol license
13 See generally KRANi~icK & MooRE, supra note 11, at 13 (describing "religious correct-
ness" as the notion that the-United States is a Christian nation and that the government
should recognize this "fact" as the major concern for Americans today in the enforcement
of free exercise rights).
14 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1437-40.
15 An electronic database search gives a rough idea of how often free exercise is men-
tioned in court decisions, compared to other First Amendment rights. On the Westlaw NY-
CS-ALL database, which includes state and federal decisions of New York courts, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, 69 decisions between
January '1, 1997 and February 1, 1999 mention the phrases "freedom of religion" or "free
exercise of religion." Reading these decisions indicates that 56 actually involve individuals'
claims based on their free exercise right. The remaining decisions mention this right with-
out deciding a claim based on it. Without a date restriction, the database contains 664
decisions that mention one of the two phrases, without necessarily deciding a free exercise
claim. By comparison, 824 decisions in the NY-CS-ALL database mention the term "free-
dom of the press," and 2799 mention "freedom of speech," also without necessarily decid-
ing claims based on these rights. Between January 1, 1997 and February 1, 1999, only 23
decisions mention "freedom of speech," and 200 mention "freedom of the press." Of the
664 decisions which mention either "freedom of religion" or "free exercise of religion,"
123 are Supreme Court cases and seven are from Second Circuit decisions that originated
in states other than New York. Therefore, at least 430 decisions that mention the right to
free exercise of religion are from New York courts. As noted above, some of these 430
cases only mention the right, without deciding a claim based on it. Nevertheless, these
figures suggest that cases involving free exercise claims occur fairly often in New York
courts and that cases involving other First Amendment rights do not exceed free exercise
cases by an overwhelming margin.
16 See CONs-rTurioNA LAw REsOURCE CT, supra note 3, at 103 (remarks of Michael
W. McConnell) (stating examples of religious "accommodations" in the early years of the
United States); Laycock, supra note 3, at 106 (describing the freedom of religion clause's
intent to prevent conflict, especially among religious minorities). Of the 56 cases in the
Westlaw NY-CS-ALL database that involved a free exercise claim between January 1, 1997
and February 1, 1999, 28 involved prisoners and 47 involved non-Christian religions or
small Christian sects, such as the Amish or Quakers.
17 See Withrow v. Bartlett, 15 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Constitutional
protections extend to prisoners insofar as the inmates must be given 'reasonable opportu-
nities... to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment~s].'" (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (alterations in original)));
Chatin v. NewYork, No. 96 Civ. 420(DLC), 1998 WL 196195 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1998)
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violated his religious convictions,' 8 Muslim proselyters' claims that a
New York City vending law requiring licenses for selling oils and in-
censes burdened their free exercise of religion, 19 and aJehovah's Wit-
ness's claim that the tort law's mitigation of damages requirement
infringed on her religious convictions by forcing her to either accept
blood transfusions against her beliefs or forego a damage award.2 0
These claims are similar because the overwhelming majority of the
United States population does not share the claimants' particular reli-
gious beliefs.
For nearly three decades, the United States Supreme Court's set-
fled interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause reflected an under-
standing of the importance of this right. Beginning with Sherbert v.
Verner,21 its cases required a compelling governmental interest to jus-
tify burdens on religious free exercise.22 Although the Court did not
grant exemptions often,23 the standard for review recognized free ex-
ercise of religion as an important substantive right.2 4 This under-
standing changed dramatically in 1990 when the Court, in Employment
Division v. Smith,25 altered its interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause to restrict the availability of religion-based exemptions from
generally applicable laws.2 6 Instead of the Sherbert compelling state in-
terest balancing test, the Smith standard denies exemptions from "neu-
tral laws of general applicability." 27 This doctrinal change raises the
(finding the rule "unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct for which the plain-
tiff was punished" on due process grounds).
18 See In re Miller, 656 N.Y.S.2d 846, 846 (Allegany Co. Ct. 1997).
19 SeeAl-Amin v. City of New York, 979 F. Supp. 168, 170-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
no violation of religious rights).
20 See Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 (App. Div. 1997).
21 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22 The United States Supreme Court announced the "compelling interest" test for
burdens on the free exercise of religion in Sherbert, Sherbert involved a Seventh-Day Advent-
ist's claim that she was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on
Saturdays, based on her religious convictions. See id. at 399-402. The Court held that "to
condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal
principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties." Id. at 406. After Sherbert, religious groups and believers were able to challenge
generally applicable laws that imposed on their beliefs or on their religiously motivated
conduct on the ground that the laws unconstitutionally penalized their conduct. See Mc-
Connell, supra note 3, at 1412-13.
23 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
24 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. Rnv. 1109, 1110 (1990) ("In practice .... the Supreme Court only rarely sided with the
free exercise claimant, despite some very powerful claims. The Court generally found
either that the free exercise right was not burdened or that the government interest was
compelling."); see also Laycock, supra note 5, at 13-17 (describing the difficulty of treating
this substantive entitlement neutrally).
25 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
26 See Laycock, supra note 5, at 1-2; McConnell, supra note 24, at 1110.
27 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted); infra notes 54-64 and
accompanying text.
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prospect that individuals or groups whose religious beliefs are not ac-
commodated through the legislative process will be left without consti-
tutional protection for any religious conduct at odds with generally
applicable legislation.28
In reaction to Smith, several state supreme courts interpreted
their state constitutions to provide more expansive protection for reli-
gious liberty than the Federal Free Exercise Clause allows under its
current narrow reading.2 9 The Smith decision also prompted a back-
lash from Congress, which passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 ('RFRA")3 0 in an attempt to use its Fourteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power 3 ' to restore the compelling interest balanc-
ing test and provide greater protection for the free exercise of
religion. In the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores,32 the United States
Supreme Court, without addressing its own free exercise jurispru-
dence, struck down RFRA on the ground that it exceeded Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power.33 F/ores effectively restored the Smith
test for assessing First Amendment free exercise claims; as a result,
state constitutions are crucial to providing heightened protection for
freedom of religion.3 4
28 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in.. . ."); see also Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of
Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Centuy Native American Free Exercise
Cases, 49 STAN. L. Ray. 773, 851 (1997) (decrying the effect of Smith on the religious prac-
tices of Native Americans); Laycock, supra note 3, at 108 (noting that "religious minorities
wvill suffer for conscience in America, and the federal courts are closed to them").
29 See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 1992) (explaining that Maine's
constitution calls for a compelling interest test); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1990) (providing that a "public safety question" must
exist to allow regulation); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (same);
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 186 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) ("Our
state constitutional and common law history support a broader reading of [Washington's
constitution], than of the First Amendment.").
30 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4
(1994)), declared unconstitutional by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
3' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see Hores, 521 U.S. at 516-17. The Supreme Court
found that the Free Exercise Clause applied to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticu 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
32 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
33 See id. at 536.
34 See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging
Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 275, 278 ("Smith has made the state's political
processes the unwitting, yet final arbiter of permissible religious conduct."); Tracey Levy,
RediscoveringRights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in
the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEmp. L. REv. 1017, 1026 (1994) (suggesting
that states "should consider the historical scope and meaning of free exercise under their
own constitutions, as well as policies, practices, and principles common to their states...
to define their states' free exercise standards"); Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the
Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith,
68 NoTm DAME L. Ray. 747, 754-55 (1993) (advising that "individuals seeking religiously
1999] 1093
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The New York Constitution, adopted twelve years before the
United States Constitution, proclaims that "[t] he free exercise and en-
joyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all mankind."35
The New York Court of Appeals has relied primarily on federal law for
its free exercise rulings in the past fifty-eight years.36 Despite a tradi-
tion of religious toleration dating to colonial times, New York courts
in recent years have only rarely invoked the state constitution to de-
cide free exercise claims.37 Although the court of appeals never de-
cided a case involving RFRA,38 New York's lower courts relied on
RFRA to decide free exercise cases.39 Since the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Smith, New York's highest court has not faced the issue of
whether the New York Constitution affords a higher level of protec-
tion for religious liberty than the Federal Free Exercise Clause does.40
Given the restrictive federal test announced in Smith and reinstated in
Flores, the NewYork Court of Appeals may have to decide free exercise
claims that are based solely on the state constitution and, in rendering
these decisions, may have to reassess the continued validity of a paral-
lel construction for the state and federal free exercise provisions. One
commentator has argued that heightened protection of the free exer-
cise of religion under the New York Constitution is "questionable" and
based exemptions from generally applicable laws should argue under both federal and
state constitutions in order to obtain their fullest free exercise protection").
35 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
36 See David E. McCraw, "Free Exercise" Under the State Constitution: Will the Exception Be-
come the Rule?, 12 TouRo L. REv. 677, 694-95 (1996). Possibly due to unfamiliarity with the
interpretation of the state constitution's free exercise provision, relatively few free exercise
claims invoke it. Reading the 56 free exercise claims in the Westlaw NY-CA-ALL database
between January 1, 1997 and February 1, 1999, see supra note 15, it appears that only three
included claims based on the New York Constitution.
37 See infra Parts II, III.B, VIA.
38 In New York State Employment Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional High School,
682 N.E.2d 960, 963-65 (N.Y. 1997), the court of appeals relied solely on Smith to support
its Free Exercise Clause holding, without mentioning RFRA. The court of appeals decided
no other free exercise cases while RFRA was enforced.
39 See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (App. Div.
1997) (deciding a negligence claim against the diocese in light of RFRA); Geisinsky v.
Village of Kings Point, 640 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (App. Div. 1996) (upholding a zoning ordi-
nance under RFRA because it did not substantially abridge the plaintiffs free exercise
rights).
40 The only case since 1990 in which the court of appeals directly addressed a claim
based on the free exercise of religion was Christ the King Regional High Schoo 682 N.E.2d at
963-65. In that case, the school argued that the New York State Labor Relations Act inter-
fered with parents' free exercise rights. See id. at 963. This claim was "invoked with sweep-
ing, threshold cloakage" and relied solely on the federal First Amendment, not on RFRA
nor on the state constitution. Id. at 964. Deciding the case based on the Smith standard,
the court of appeals both rejected the claim because the New York State Labor Relations
Act was a neutral law of general applicability and refused to address whether it would
sustain a more specific claim, including one involving a particularized burden on free exer-
cise. See id.
1094 Vol. 84:1088
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
that the free exercise protection embodied in the New York Constitu-
ion may remain "largely forgotten."41
An examination of the history and precedent of free exercise in
New York, of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, of the pro-
tection the court of appeals affords to other personal liberties under
the New York Constitution, and of lower court cases in New York that
interpret the state's free exercise clause compels a different interpre-
tation of the possibility for heightened protection of religious free-
dom in New York State. If free exercise claimants realize that the New
York Constitution may offer a higher level of protection than the Fed-
eral Constitution, they probably will begin to base their claims on the
state provision. These challenges ultimately may be successful, even
when the law at issue is one of general applicability.42
Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
doctrine to provide a backdrop for the interpretation of states' consti-
tutional provisions that endorse free exercise. Parts II through V con-
struct the theoretical framework within which the New York Court of
Appeals would interpret the free exercise clause of the state constitu-
tion. Part II applies this framework and provides the historical back-
ground for the development of free exercise principles in New York
State, which culminated in the adoption of article I, section 3 of the
New York Constitution. Part HI analyzes the cases in which the New
York Court of Appeals has interpreted the state's constitutional provi-
sion. Part IV examines the development of free exercise jurispru-
dence in other states, which is based on provisions of those states'
constitutions, and analyzes the extent to which these provisions might
provide guidance to the court of appeals. Part V catalogues the pro-
tections the New York Court of Appeals has afforded other civil liber-
ties under the state constitution. Part V's analysis will help assess
whether the court's doctrine in these areas provides guidance for how
it will treat challenges to state laws that burden religious practices.
Part VI discusses post-Smith cases in NewYork's lower courts, considers
the principles the court of appeals would probably use to analyze a
free exercise claim under the state constitution, and describes how
claimants should employ the court's probable interpretation to in-
crease their odds of success.
41 McCraw, supra note 36, at 707.




THE CURRENT STATE OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A. The Balancing Test and the Smith "Law of General
Applicability" Test
Prior to its 1963 decision in Sherbert, the Supreme Court had de-
cided relatively few cases involving the construction of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 43 The Court had held that freedom of belief, as distinct
from freedom of religious conduct, had absolute protection under the
First Amendment.44 The Court, however, upheld generally applicable
laws that indirectly burdened religious conduct only to the extent that
the conduct did not conflict with the law, provided that the state had
no less burdensome means to accomplish its purpose.45
In Sherbert, the Supreme Court increased the level of scrutiny for
laws that burdened the free exercise of religion.46 The Sherbert test
required the state to show a compelling interest in burdening, even
indirectly, the plaintiff's free exercise of her religion.47 In addition,
the decision required the state to prove that its means of protecting
43 See generally A.E. Dick Howard, The Wall of Separation: The Supreme Court as Uncertain
Stonemason, in RELIGION AND THE STATE 85, 86-87 (James E. Wood,Jr. ed., 1985) (discussing
the evolution of the Court's free exercisejurisprudence). The first case in which the Court
confronted the Free Exercise Clause was Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which
involved a claim by Mormons that a federal anti-polygamy law impermissibly burdened
their freedom of religion. See Howard, supra, at 86. Except for Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890), which also involved the religious freedom of Mormons, "the Supreme Court
had little further occasion to explore the First Amendment's religion clauses until the
1940s," when the Court considered (and rejected) claims byJehovah's Witnesses, such as
Cantwell v. Connecticu, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Howard, supra, at 86; see also WILLIAM C. SHEP-
HERD, To SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 8-11 (1985) (discussing Supreme Court free
exercise cases prior to Sherbert and arguing that "until the 1960s, important decisions that
attempted to balance first amendment religious rights against legitimate concerns of the
state were weighted in favor of the latter").
44 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("Certain aspects of religious
exercise cannot, in any way, be restricted or burdened by either federal or state legislation.
Compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship is
strictly forbidden. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.").
45 See id. at 607. The Court noted that
if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the stat-
ute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the
State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden.
Id.
46 See Carmella, supra note 34, at 277; McConnell, supra note 3, at 1412; McCraw,
supra note 36, at 680-681.
47 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (framing the issue as "whether
some compelling state interest ... justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First
Amendment right").
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the compelling interest were the least restrictive possible.48 For
twenty-seven years, the Supreme Court applied this standard to free
exercise challenges of federal and state laws, which resulted "in court-
mandated religious exemptions from facially neutral laws of general
application whenever unjustified burdens were found."49 Neverthe-
less, few free exercise claims in the Supreme Court were successful. 50
Despite the limited success of claimants in the high court, the compel-
ling interest test found broad application in lower federal courts, in
state courts, and in informing the decisions of legislatures and execu-
tive agencies.5 1
Despite the infrequency with which the Supreme Court validated
religious exemptions, its analysis of free exercise cases under the Sher-
bert test remained both consistent and relatively uncontroversial. 52
The Sherbert standard offered at least the possibility that an individual
could claim a constitutional exemption from a law solely because it
burdened the right to free exercise of religion. 53 But in 1990, the
Supreme Court rejected Sherberts compelling interest standard for
free exercise claims,5 4 effectively foreclosing claims based solely on
the Free Exercise Clause. Replacing its previous test, the Court "held
that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) ."55 In order for a law to be
unconstitutional under the Smith standard, it must either be specifi-
cally intended to burden the practice of a religion 56 or fall within
some exception to the rule of "general applicability."57 The Smith ma-
48 See id. at 407 (holding that "it would plainly be incumbent upon the [Government]
to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights").
49 Carmella, supra note 34, at 277.
50 See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1109-10 ("[T]he free exercise doctrine was more
talk than substance."). Professor McConnell contends that "it must be conceded that the
Supreme Court before Smith did not really apply a genuine 'compelling interest' test," but
instead applied a more relaxed standard. Id. at 1127. Nevertheless, he insists that the
balancing analysis employed was a form of heightened scrutiny with more teeth than the
standard announced in Smith. See id. at 1128.
51 See id. at 1110.
52 See i& at 1109.
53 Cf. id. at 1109-10 ("In its language, it was highly protective of religious liberty.").
54 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) ("We conclude today that
the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our prece-
dents, is to hold the [Sherbert] test inapplicable to such challenges.").
55 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
56 See Carmella, supra note 34, at 278 ("To be constitutionally suspect, a law must
target religion."). The Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance on these grounds in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
57 Douglas Laycock has identified six exceptions to the general Smith standard. These
include two instances of "hybrid situations" (when freedom of religion is being exercised
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jority, however, held that the Sherbert balancing test "would not apply
... to require exemptions from a generally applicable.., law," which
narrowed the range of possible exemptions.58
Smith effectively forced courts deciding free exercise cases under
the Constitution to apply the "general applicability" standard, unless
the claimant could persuade the court that the free exercise claim was
tied to another constitutional right, thereby falling within one of the
Smith exceptions. 59 Claimants who cannot do so lose their claims,
without the court considering either the extent to which the law bur-
dens their freedom of religion or the state's interest in imposing the
burden. 60 For example, a federal district court following Smith held
that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect a Hmong couple, whose
religious faith strictly prohibits desecration of the deceased, from a
state law that mandated an autopsy on their son's body.61 Another
federal court upheld a city ordinance that prohibited churches from
operating in commercial areas, even though the law significantly im-
paired the ability of one congregation to participate in religious serv-
ices. 62 Regulators relying on Smith forced Sikhs to remove the turbans
required by their religion to work on construction sites.63 Smith effec-
tively removed from the Free Exercise Clause any substantive protec-
tion for religion per se, leaving a formal neutrality that reduced
freedom of religion to a special case of equal protection and which
eviscerated it as an independent constitutional right.64 After Smith,
the Free Exercise Clause is no longer available as a means of seeking
an exemption to a law of general applicability.
B. The RFRA, Flores, and the Reinstatement of the Smith Test
Three years after the Smith decision, Congress passed RFRA.65
This statute forbade the government (federal or state) from "substan-
tially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion [unless] it demon-
either as speech or in the context of parental control of a child's education) and "regula-
tory schemes that require an 'individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for
the relevant conduct.'" Laycock, supra note 5, at 41 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
58 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
59 See Laycock, supra note 5, at 41.
60 See id at 54 & n.218 (noting that, after Smith, "the Court... is unlikely to be
vigorous about checking for bad [legislative] motive or religious gerrymander").
61 SeeYang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
62 See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1990)
(dismissing that part of the church's claim that relied solely on a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause), affd in part and reuld in par; 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
63 See John W. Whitehead, Religious Freedom in the Nineties: Betwixt and Between Flores
and Smith, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 105, 106 (1997).
64 See Laycock, supra note 5, at 4, 54-55.
65 RFRA was backed by an ideologically diverse coalition of organizations, including
the National Association of Evangelicals, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the American Jewish Congress, and was sponsored in
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strates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est."'66 RFRA was intended to restore the Sherbert test for free exercise
cases.67 For four years, courts decided free exercise cases by relying
on RFRA's reiteration of the Sherbert compelling interest standard.68
In 1997, the Supreme Court decided in Flores whether RFRA was
constitutional. 69 The Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio sued the
City of Boerne, Texas, after the city denied a building permit to ex-
pand a historic church to accommodate an expanding congrega-
tion.70 The Archbishop relied on RFRA, claiming the city's action
violated the congregation's free exercise of religion.71 The Court's
opinion addressed neither the limits of free exercise nor the appropri-
ate constitutional test under which to analyze the Archbishop's
claim. 72 Instead, it examined the narrow issue of whether Congress's
enacting RFRA was a constitutional use of its power.73 The Court held
that by enacting RFRA, Congress unconstitutionally exceeded its Four-
teenth Amendment power74 and intruded into the judiciary's realm.75
Only the dissenting and concurring Justices engaged in a substantive
discussion of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.7 6 By striking down
RFRA, the Court effectively restored the Smith standard as the applica-
the Senate by Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs
Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b) (1994).
67 See McCraw, supra note 36, at 683; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
512-16 (1997) (discussing the legislative history and congressional intent underlying the
passage of RFRA).
68 See, e.g., Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1997) (analyzing a prisoner's claim
according to the statutory language in RFRA and determining that the state did not "sub-
stantially burden" his free exercise of religion by limiting inmates to three hours of group
worship per week); Belgard v. Hawai'i, 883 F. Supp. 510, 516-17 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding
RFRA constitutional as applied to a Native American prisoner's claim for a religious ex-
emption to prison haircutting requirements); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 206-
07 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting a preliminary injunction based on RFRA for a prisoner who
was prohibited from wearing beads in conformity with his Santeria beliefs); Hunt v. Hunt,
648 A.2d 843, 854 (Vt. 1994) (analyzing a claim that incarceration to enforce a support
order violated a father's free exercise rights under RFRA and the Vermont Constitution
and determining that both required the government to use less restrictive means to en-
force the order to avoid infringing on plaintiff's religious liberty).
69 See B/ores, 521 U.S. at 511.
70 See id. at 512.
71 See id.
72 See id at 512-36.
73 See id. at 516-36.
74 See id at 535-36.
75 See id.
76 Justice O'Connor's dissent in FRores vigorously challenged the holding in Smith- "I
believe that we should reexamine our holding in Smith, and do so in this very case." Id. at
548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Her dissent included an extensive history of the original
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 548-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ble test for assessing claims against state actors for violating the Free
Exercise Clause.
Despite the Flores decision, a plaintiff challenging a federallaw that
burdens her free exercise of religion may still invoke the RFRA stan-
dard in limited situations. 77 But by striking down those sections of
RFRA based on the Fourteenth Amendment, E/ores leaves free exercise
claimants with the Smith neutral law of general applicability test. Be-
lievers whose religious practices collide with laws of general applicabil-
ity must argue either that the law in question is intended to burden
religious practice78 or that a "hybrid" situation exists in which the free-
dom of religion is burdened along with another fundamental right.79
In addition, claimants can assert that their state constitution protects
the free exercise of religion to a greater extent than the Constitution
does after Smith. The balance of this Note discusses the basis on which
free exercise claimants in New York should argue that its constitution
currently affords their religious practices greater protection than the
Federal Constitution.
II
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION iN NEW YORK-INTRODUcTION
AND HISTORY
The return to the Smith standard,80 which allows no exceptions to
laws of general applicability for religious exercise, and the passionate
debate within the current Supreme Court over the interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause,8' suggest that state constitutions may pro-
vide a better route than the Federal Constitution to heightened pro-
tection for religious free exercise.82 Echoing Justice O'Connor's
Justice Scalia's concurrence (joined by justice Stevens) defended the Smith holding. See id.
at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77 See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In reYoung), 141 F.3d 854, 860-61
(8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998) (noting that F/ores did not decide the
constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal law and holding "that Congress had the
authority to enact RFRA and make it applicable to the law of bankruptcy"). In re Young
involved a claim that a bankruptcy court, by requiring a church to turn over a bankrupt
member's tithes to the bankruptcy trustee as a fraudulent conveyance, violated the mem-
ber's free exercise of religion. See id. at 857.
78 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
79 See supra note 57.
80 See supra Part I.A
81 See Levy, supra note 34, at 1024-26 (detailing the divergent positions of the Justices
in their various opinions in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye); supra note 76.
82 See Carmella, supra note 34, at 279; see also WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Ray. 535, 548 (1986) (arguing "that the [Supreme] Court's contraction of federal rights
and remedies" led, in the fifteen years following 1970, to "over 250 published [state court]
opinions holding that the constitutional minimums set by the United States Supreme
Court were insufficient to satisfy the more stringent requirements of state constitutional
law").
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assessment of the Free Exercise Clause's historical underpinnings in
her Flores dissent,8 3 one commentator has urged that "as the state
courts seek to interpret their own free exercise provisions in the wake
of Smith, they should consider the historical scope and meaning of
free exercise under their own constitutions."8 4
The New York Court of Appeals traditionally has exercised in-
dependent judgment about the content of the New York Constitu-
tion.85 ChiefJudge Kaye of the court of appeals has stated that "where
we conclude that the Supreme Court has changed course and diluted
constitutional principles," the court of appeals has the "responsibility
to support the State Constitution when [it] examine [s] whether [it]
should follow along as a matter of state law."8 6 Chief Judge Kaye has
repeatedly articulated in carefully considered concurrences her firm
belief that the court of appeals should independently interpret the
New York Constitution.8 7 Her presence as the chiefjudge may signal
a renewed commitment in the court of appeals to state constitutional
protection for free exercise rights.88
Historically, the New York Court of Appeals has accounted for
many factors when determining whether a constitutional right has a
broader scope under the state constitution than under the Federal
Constitution.8 9 These factors include the following: "differences in
the text, structure, or historical underpinnings between the State and
Federal Constitutions";90 distinctive local attitudes concerning the
right; whether the issue is of particular state or local concern; and
whether the right has historically received greater protection under
the New York Constitution than under the Federal Constitution.91
This Part assesses the scope of free exercise in New York by examining
the history of freedom of religion in New York and the state constitu-
tion's free exercise clause.
83 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-65 (1997) (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
84 Levy, supra note 34, at 1026.
85 See infra Part V.
86 People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1347 (N.Y. 1992) (Kaye, J., concurring).
87 See generally Vincent Martin Bonventre, New York's Chiefjudge Kaye: Her Separate Opin-
ions Bode Well for Renewed State Constitutionalism at the Court of Appeals, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1163
(1994) (discussing Judge Kaye's concurrences and dissents in cases that significantly cur-
tailed state constitutional protections of various rights and liberties during the era of previ-
ous ChiefJudge Wachtler).
88 See id. at 1205 (describing it as "clear, from the post-Wachtler voting and decisional
records, that the court has moved in IJudge Kaye's] direction").
89 See People v. Alvarez, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899 (N.Y. 1987) (listing factors); see also infra
Parts IV.B, VI.B (discussing how the New York Court of Appeals would analyze a free exer-
cise claim).




A. Origins of Free Exercise in New York
New York had a high degree of religious diversity at the end of
the colonial period.92 In its early years as New Amsterdam, the colony
was extremely intolerant of several religious groups and established
the Dutch Reformed Church as its official religion.93 The Dutch colo-
nial rulers eventually developed tolerance for the Puritan beliefs of
New England immigrants who settled on Long Island, mainly because
of their need to encourage trade and settlement in the colony.94 After
the British seized New Amsterdam from the Dutch in 1664, the colony
did not establish an official church. 95 Instead, the English rulers of
New York extended a "promise of religious toleration to all Chris-
tians."96 In 1674, the Duke of York, who held the patent to the col-
ony, instructed his governor to permit the free exercise of "what
Religion soever," as long as the religion did not disturb the public
peace. 97 The Colonial Assembly, which first convened in 1683,98 en-
acted a Charter of Liberties establishing a bill of rights for the col-
ony99 and "confirm [ing] the substance of the Duke's Laws regarding
religion."100
During the next ninety years, colonial authorities ineffectively at-
tempted to promote the Anglican Church in the face of a diverse ma-
jority of believers in other faiths, which resulted in effective religious
toleration. 1°1 "New York continued to provide a haven for diverse
92 See PETERJ. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY- A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 10
(1996); see also ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1964) (including NewYork in an elite group of provinces that "provided more of
a melting pot of religious and national groups than any other part of America and conse-
quently were generally ahead of other sections in developing religious freedom"); Edwin S.
Gaustad, Religion and Ratification, in THE FIRST FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 41, 56 (including
New York as one of the original states most representative of religious diversity).
93 See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 62 (1986).
94 See id. at 62; GALIE, supra note 92, at 16-17.
95 See CURRY, supra note 93, at 62. Four counties in the metropolitan New York area
claimed to have established the Anglican church, but non-Anglicans denied this claim. See
id. at 161; see also GAUE, supra note 92, at 29 (detailing the history of religious toleration in
New York between 1665 and the adoption of the New York State Constitution in 1777,
including the period following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 during which the colonial
government "pursued an active policy of ensuring that the Anglican Church had a privi-
leged position in the colony").
96 GALIE, supra note 92, at 18; see also CURRY, supra note 93, at 62 (describing this
guarantee as one of the provisions of the Duke's Laws of 1665).
97 GALIE, supra note 92, at 29 (quoting 3 DOCUMENTS RELATrvE TO THE COLONIAL HIs-
TORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 218 (Edmund B. O'Callaghan & Berthold Fernow eds.,
1853-1887)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see CURRY, supra note 93, at 62.
98 See PETERJ. GALIE, THE NEW YoRK STATE CONSTITUTION 2 (1991).
99 See Donald S. Lutz, The U.S. Bill of Rights in Historical Perspective, in CoNTExTS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 3, 4 (Stephen L. Schechter & Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990).
100 CURRY, supra note 93, at 63.
10 See id. at 62-72.
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groups,"10 2 including Quakers andJews. °3 One exception to this "be-
nign neglect '10 4 was the oppressive treatment of Catholics, who in
1691 were the only denomination expressly excluded from the "liberty
of Conscience" in New York.' 0 5 The restriction on Catholics' free ex-
ercise in New York remained until the adoption of the Constitution of
1777.106 The Constitution of 1777 also nullified any establishment
that had taken place.10 7 Thus, "New York was the first state to aban-
don, by constitutional provision, the previously established churches.
Of the first wave of state constitutions adopted between 1776 and
1784, New York came closest to establishing complete religious
freedom."' 0
B. The Free Exercise Clause of the New York Constitution
The New York Constitution, article I, section 3, reads:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and wor-
ship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed
in this state to all mankind; and no person shall be rendered incom-
petent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of reli-
gious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not
be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify prac-
tices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state. 109
The first and last clauses of this provision are virtually the same as they
were in the state's first constitution. 110 This broadly worded free exer-
cise protection reflected New York's tradition of toleration and pro-
102 Id. at 71.
103 See id.
104 McConnell, supra note 3, at 1424 (referring to the policy of lukewarm religious
toleration of Protestant dissenters, Quakers, and Jews).
105 CuRy, supra note 93, at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also GAUIE,
supra note 92, at 50 (noting the continued hostilities toward Catholics, even in 1777); 1
CHRLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEw YORK 542 -(photo. reprint
1994) (1906) (indicating that the royal instructions to Governor Sloughter were to permit
a "liberty of Conscience to all persons except Papists" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106 See 1 LINcOLN, supra note 105, at 541-45 (noting that the protection of the free
exercise rights of Catholics was "a marked change from the policy concerning religious
toleration which then prevailed in the colony"); GALIE, supra note 92, at 50. But cf. CuRR,
supra note 93, at 162 (arguing that both a constitutional citizenship requirement and a
later statutory test oath that required renouncing ,foreign ecclesiastical powers effectively
curtailed Catholics' free exercise of their religion).
107 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWs 2636 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTrrTrloNs] ("[AIII such parts of the said
common law, and.., statutes ... as may be construed to establish or maintain any particu-
lar denomination of Christians or their ministers.., are, abrogated and rejected.").
108 GALIE, supra note 92, at 50.
109 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
110 See N.Y. CoNsT. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONST-
TrrToNs, supra note 107, at 2637; GAUIE, supra note 98, at 38. The second clause was added
during the 1846 Constitutional Convention. See id.
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tection of religious liberty.1 1' The New York Constitutional
Convention that drafted the Constitution of 1777 ranked with Vir-
ginia's in importance because of both its deliberations and the lan-
guage it adopted to guarantee the free exercise of religion. 112
By 1789, twelve of the original states had provisions in their state
constitutions protecting religious liberty.1 3 New York was one of only
four states that unambiguously extended constitutional protection to
all religious believers. 114 During the NewYork Constitutional Conven-
tion, John Jay made two proposals to exclude Catholics from the free
exercise provision. 115 Jay withdrew one proposal because of fierce op-
position from other members of the convention and saw the other
proposal fail by a vote of nineteen to ten." 6 The convention's success
in extending protection to unpopular faiths indicates "the determina-
tion then manifest by many of the patriots to incorporate in the Con-
stitution a provision that should absolutely insure religious
freedom."117
"[P] articular, defined state interests" limit the right to free exer-
cise of religion in the New York Constitution." 8 The final clause of
article I, section 3 provides that "the liberty of conscience hereby se-
cured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state."" 9
Nine of the original states adopted constitutions that contained some
restriction on the right to the free exercise of religion to protect the
peace or safety of the states.' 20 The last clause of article I, section 3 of
the New York Constitution is a good example of the manner in which
111 See GALIE, supra note 92, at 49.
112 See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 92, at 72-73.
113 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1455 (noting that Connecticut was the only
exception).
114 The provisions in two states protected only Christians and those in five other states
confined the protection to believers in God. See id. & n.237. The first draft of the constitu-
tion presented to the New York Constitutional Convention mandated "that free Toleration
be forever allowed in this State... to all denominations of Christians without preference
or distinction and to allJews, Turks and Infidels." 1 LINCOLN, supra note 105, at 541 (alter-
ation omitted). This phrase was ultimately excluded from the Constitution of 1777, but
the breadth of religious freedom it represents is reflected in the phrase "free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference."
N.Y. CONSr. art. I, § 3.
115 See I LINCOLN, supra note 105, at 544; see also GAUE, supra note 92, at 50 (noting
that Jay "pressed ardently for provisions which would have restricted Catholicism in the
state").
116 See 1 LINCOLN, supra note 105, at 544-45.
117 1 id. at 543-44.
118 McConnell, supra note 3, at 1461.
119 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
120 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1461 & n.257.
1104 [Vol. 84:1088
FREE EXERCISE OF RELTGION
early state constitutions limited rights by restricting the extent to
which the right could be exercised. 121
Several authorities argue that a court must weigh a claimant's
right against the state's interest when a constitutional provision grants
a broadly defined freedom but qualifies it with a public safety restric-
tion.122 Justice O'Connor contends that article I, section 3 of the New
York Constitution, and similar provisions of other early state constitu-
tions, "make sense only if the right to free exercise was viewed as gen-
erally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden only when
necessary to secure important government purposes."' 23 The lan-
guage of the New York Constitution explicitly invokes "peace or
safety" as the important government purpose that limits the free exer-
cise of religion. Under this interpretation of the limiting clause, a
court must give religiously motivated conduct an exemption from a
generally applicable "law[ ] up to the point that such conduct
breache[s] public peace or safety."124
The history of religious toleration and freedom in colonial New
York and the language of article I, section 3 of the New York Constitu-
tion, as limited by the last clause of that section, suggest that NewYork
courts should balance a claimant's right to religious freedom against
the state's interests in preventing "licentiousness" and in protecting
"the peace or safety of [the] state."' 25 An early New York court deci-
sion that construed the state constitution's free exercise clause recog-
nized this tension between the right and the corresponding limitation
and decided in favor of the free exercise claimant because the govern-
ment's interest was insufficient. 26 The next Part of this Note details
the New York courts' interpretations of article I, section 3, which indi-
121 See GAUTE, supra note 98, at 38 (positing that the peace or safety clause "is typical of
early state constitutions in correlating a right with the responsibility for abuse of that
right").
122 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 548-64 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting); McConnell, supra note 3, at 1464; Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Religious
Free Exercise Under State Constitutions, 34J. CHURCH & ST. 303, 314-15 (1992) (implying that a
court will have to weigh the interests to give meaning to a peace or safety clause because
"the boundary [the clause] sets out must be different in some way from the boundary set
down for all general activity"); G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutionalism and "First Amendment"
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES 21, 24 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988); see also
CHESTER JAMES ANrEAU Yr AL., RELGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 65-99 (1965)
(surveying the common law history of state constitutional limitations imposed upon the
free exercise of religion and noting that a balancing test is applied in many of the cases).
123 _Fores, 521 U.S. at 555 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124 McConnell, supra note 3, at 1462.
125 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
126 See People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), in Privileged Communications to Cler-
gymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 199-209 (1955) [hereinafter People v. Phillips]. This case is also
discussed in GAUE, supra note 92, at 49, and in McConnell, supra note 3, at 1410-12, 1504-
05. The defendant's name is variously spelled "Phillips" and "Philips" in the original deci-
sion. See People v. Phillips, supra, at 199.
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cate that though "the religious exception-seeker has rarely pre-
vailed,"1 27 the test remained basically the same.
III
INTERPRETATIONS OF NEW YoRK CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I,
SECTION 3
A. Cases Decided Before the Incorporation of the First
Amendment: The Origins of Balancing Personal
Religious Freedom Against State Interests
Despite New York's history of religious freedom and the broadly
worded free exercise provision of article I, section 3, state courts since
1777 rarely have upheld free exercise claims under the state constitu-
tion. 128 In 1813, a New York court directly applied the state constitu-
tion's free exercise clause in People v. Phillips,129 in which the
government attempted to force a Catholic priest to testify in court re-
garding what he had heard in a confessional. 30 The priest contended
that an order requiring him to breach the secrecy of the confessional
would violate his conscience, his duties as a minister of the Catholic
Church, and the Church's sacred tenets, thereby burdening his free
exercise of religion.' 31 The court asked whether "the natural ten-
dency of [withholding evidence obtained in the confessional] is to
produce practices inconsistent with the public safety or tranquil-
lity."1 32 It concluded that the secrecy of the confessional, which is crit-
ical to the free exercise of the Catholic faith, does not conflict with the
peace or safety of the state. 133
In 1903, the New York Court of Appeals decided a free exercise
challenge under the New York Constitution for the first time. In Peo-
ple v. Pierson,134 the defendant appealed a conviction under a statute
that criminalized a parent's failure to furnish medical assistance to his
127 McCraw, supra note 36, at 686.
128 See GAUE, supra note 98, at 38; McCraw, supra note 36, at 680.
129 See People v. Phillips, supra note 126, at 199-201.
130 See id.
131 See id. at 200.
132 Id. at 208.
133 See id. at 209; see also GAIE, supra note 92, at 49 (discussing the decision of the court
in Phillips); McConnell, supra note 3, at 1505-06 (same). The decision in an earlier case,
People v. Ruggles, 8Johns. 290 (1811), which affirmed a conviction for blasphemy and relied
on common law restrictions on the right of free speech, also included dicta which main-
tained that the free exercise provision should be read narrowly, see id. at 295-96, and held
blasphemy to be "an offense against the public peace and safety." Id at 297; see GALIE,
supra note 98, at 38.
134 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903). Apparently, no earlier court of appeals cases were
brought under the state's free exercise clause. David McCraw notes that neither the par-
ties nor the court in Pierson cite earlier court of appeals cases. See McCraw, supra note 36, at
686 n.50.
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child.'3 5 The defendant claimed that his failure.was religiously moti-
vated 3 6 and asserted that the criminal statute violated article I, sec-
tion 3.137 The court, noting that "[t]he peace and safety of the state
involve [s] the protection of the lives and health of its children,"' 38
held that the state constitution does not guarantee protection to "acts
which are not worship.'u3 9 The court's subsequent reference to the
constitutionally permissible prohibition against polygamy, even when
practiced as part of a religious faith, 140 indicated the meaning of its
holding: the act of withholding medical care from one's child, even
on religious grounds, is not an act of worship because it conflicts with
the state interest in protecting children's lives and health.' 41 The
state may use its police power to override a religious claim of a parent
who denies medical care to a child.' 42 The defendant's claim to con-
stitutional protection for his religiously motivated action (or inaction)
failed because that action was inconsistent with the peace or safety of
the state.
The court of appeals next decided a free exercise claim in 1916
in People v. Cole.143 A Christian Scientist appealed his conviction under
a statute that prohibited the practice of medicine without a license.44
The statute included a provision that it should "not be construed to
affect... the practice of the religious tenets of any church.' 45 In
deciding that the appellant's practice of faith healing fell within the
exception, the court asserted that "the exception to the prohibition in
the statute is broader than the provision of the Constitution of this
state"' 46 and that "[t]he exception in the statute is not confined to
worship or belief, but includes the practice of religious tenets."a47
While apparently narrowing the scope of actions that fall under the
free exercise provision, the court failed to decide whether the dis-
135 See Pierson, 68 N.E. at 244.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 246.
138 Id
139 Id. McGraw argues that by this phrase, the court "chose to impose a narrow defini-
tion of religious freedom." McGraw, supra note 36, at 687. In the context of the reference
to the "lives and health of its children," Pierson, 68 N.E. at 246, and the example of polyg-
amy as a religious practice that may be criminalized, however, the phrase "acts which are
not worship," id., does not limit the range of behavior that may be protected under the
free exercise clause; rather, it outlines what religious behavior is subject to the "peace or
safety" limitation of the clause.
140 See Pierson, 68 N.E. at 246.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 246-47.
'43 113 N.E. 790 (N.Y. 1916).
144 See id. at 791.
145 Id. (quoting Public Health Law § 173) (internal quotation marks omitted) (altera-
tion in original).




puted Christian Science practice constituted "religious profession and
worship."1 48 Instead, it decided the case exclusively on statutory
grounds and did not reach the question of the state's countervailing
interest.149
In 1939, the court of appeals considered the case of People ex rel.
Fish v. Sandstrom. °50 The parents of a girl whom the school had sent
home after she refused, on religious grounds, to salute the flag ap-
pealed their conviction for permitting their daughter's truancy.151 Re-
versing the conviction on the ground that the student, rather than the
parents, should face discipline under the education laws, 152 the court
noted that "[w] hile legislation for the establishment of religion is for-
bidden, and its free exercise permitted, it does not follow that every-
thing which may be so called can be tolerated. The States, like
Congress, are free to reach actions which are in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order."1 53 After using this language to
compare the countervailing values of religious free exercise and "ac-
tions which are in violation of social duties," the court, without analy-
sis, concluded that the flag salute requirements did not violate any
constitutional rights.154 In his concurrence, Judge Lehman con-
tended that the State's "powers may not ... be asserted to prohibit
beliefs and practices which are not in conflict with good order or to
compel acts which have no reasonable relation to the peace or safety
or even the general welfare of the State or Nation."155 The majority
implicitly, and the concurrence explicitly, recognized that a free exer-
cise claim required weighing the individual right against the interests
of the state, even though the majority indicated that the free exercise
claim, by itself, would have failed in this case.156
B. Cases Decided After Incorporation: Balancing Continued and
Some Independent Bases for Decision Under the State
Constitution
In 1940, the United States Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment applied to state actions through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.157 Thereafter, until the 1980s, individuals rarely invoked the
state constitution when bringing free exercise claims before the New
148 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
149 See Cole, 113 N.E. at 794.
150 18 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1939).
151 See id. at 841.
152 See id. at 842.
153 Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
154 Id. at 843-44.
155 Id. at 846 (Lehman, J., concurring).
156 See id. at 844.
157 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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York Court of Appeals, and the court decided most cases on the basis
of the Federal Constitution alone. 158 In the few cases in which the
New York Court of Appeals considered both the state and federal free
exercise provisions, it used language indicating that it considered the
analysis and result under both provisions to be identical. 15 9 But in
several cases, including the most recent court of appeals case to con-
strue the state free exercise provision, the court of appeals applied a
balancing test for the state claim and indicated that the scope of state
protection is not coterminous with that of the Federal Constitution.
In 1943, the court of appeals first articulated the possibility of
divergent standards applicable to state and federal free exercise
claims. People v. Barber160 involved the appeal of a Jehovah's Witness
convicted of selling religious tracts without a license.161 In deciding
not to construe the licensing statute as prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, ChiefJudge Lehman stated that the right to freedom of wor-
ship was guaranteed both by the Federal Constitution, and "in per-
haps even plainer language by the Constitution of the State of New
York."' 62 He asserted
that in determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of funda-
mental rights of the individual in the Constitution of the State of
New York, this court is bound to exercise its independentjudgment
and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the Constitution of
the United States.163
The court held that the statute should be construed not to pertain to
the sale of religious tracts, allowing it to avoid the balancing of per-
sonal religious interests against state interests. 164
In most of the cases it decided after the incorporation of the First
Amendment, the New York Court of Appeals found that the state's
interests outweighed the individual's free exercise rights and there-
158 See GALE, supra note 98, at 38; McCraw, supra note 36, at 694-95 (listing cases).
159 See, e.g., La Rocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606, 612-13 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that the
state's interest in ensuring a fair trial outweighed the right of an attorney, who was also a
priest, to exercise his freedom of religion by wearing clerical garb in the courtroom);
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 N.E.2d 433, 434-35 (N.Y.
1948) (holding that Jehovah's Witnesses' claim that a regulation'that prohibited their en-
trance into apartment complexes for the purpose of proselytizing violated their right to
free exercise under both constitutions was unsustainable).
160 46 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1943).
161 See iU at 329-30.
162 Id. at 331.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 332-33 (declining to rule on the constitutionality of a literal construction
of the statute because if the statute were "so construed[,] it might be applied in [a] man-
ner which would seriously burden or destroy fundamental rights" and therefore conclud-




fore denied the free exercise claim. 165 However, the court consist-
ently has balanced the individual's right to free exercise against the
state's countervailing interests in protecting the public.166 A lower
court decision, which the court of appeals subsequently affirmed, ar-
ticulated the test in New York:
[I] t has been long held that the peace and safety of society may not
be interfered with by religious scruples, as indeed our State Consti-
tution expressly prescribes.
We balance, then, the interest of the individual right of reli-
gious worship against the interest of the state which is sought to be
enforced. The process of the balancing of interests is twofold: first,
a determination whether a restriction will be thus imposed on the
individual's freedom of worship; and secondly, a determination
whether the presence of a restriction is justified, after a considera-
tion of the social and constitutional values involved.167
In several subsequent cases, which the court of appeals decided
exclusively under the Free Exercise Clause, free exercise claims
165 Cf McGraw, supra note 36, at 694 (noting that the claimants in "the more recent
free exercise cases before the court of appeals... have continued to fare poorly").
166 See, e.g, La Rocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606, 612-13 (N.Y. 1975) ("[Tlhe particular
limited religious practice has been found to conflict with the State's paramount duty to
insure a fair and impartial trial. The respective interests must be balanced to determine
whether the incidental burdening is justified."); Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239
N.E.2d 891, 896 (N.Y. 1968) ("We have not said that considerations of the surrounding
area and potential traffic hazards are unrelated to the public health, safety, or welfare
when religious structures are involved. We have simply said that they are outweighed by
the constitutional prohibition against the abridgement of the free exercise of religion
.... ");Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672 (N.Y. 1951) ("States may validly
regulate the manner of expressing religious views if the regulation bears reasonable rela-
tion to the public welfare. Freedom to believe-or not to believe-is absolute; freedom to
act is not. 'Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.'" (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)), rev'd, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (failing to
consider the free exercise claim, but reversing the ruling that rescinded a license to show a
film that was considered "sacrilegious" on the grounds that such a rescission violated the
claimant's constitutional rights of free speech and freedom of the press). In La Rocca, the
court quoted first to Sherbert for the federal compelling interest standard and then de-
scribed Sherbert and Yoder as cases in which religious exemptions were granted because the
petitioners' free exercise came into conflict with state interests that were "not of para-
mount importance." La Rocca, 338 N.E.2d at 612. The court found that the "paramount
duty to insure a fair and impartial trial" was much more important and therefore denied
the free exercise claim. IM. at 612-13. The contrast between interests that are "paramount"
and those "not of paramount importance," id. at 612, suggests that the court was applying a
version of the Sherbert compelling interest test to a free exercise claim under the New York
Constitution, though the language used in the opinion is that of simple balancing. See id.
at 612-13.
167 People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (App. Div. 1966) (citations omitted),
affd, 236 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1968). In this case, the court denied a claim that the free
exercise of the Hindu faith precluded a witess from receiving a contempt citation for
refusing to testify against her teachers. See id. at 789-90.
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failed.168 Nevertheless, in two cases, the court of appeals argued that
it could construe the state's free exercise clause independently of the
federal clause, which would allow a claimant to bring a successful free
exercise claim under the state constitution even if the claim would fail
under the Federal Constitution. 69 One year before the Supreme
Court established the free exercise "compelling interest" test in Sher-
bert v. Verner,1*7 the New York Court of Appeals decided Brown v. Mc-
Ginnis.'17 In Brown, a prison warden denied a group of Muslim
prisoners permission to seek spiritual advice from the Temple of Islam
headed by Malcolm X. The trial court dismissed the prisoners' free
exercise claim without a hearing.172 Reversing the dismissal, the court
of appeals discussed the appropriate standard for deciding a free exer-
cise claim based on the NewYork Constitution and instructed the trial
court to determine on remand whether the restriction on the prison-
ers' free exercise of religion was "reasonable.'u73 The court noted
that the final clause of article I, section 3 explicitly limited the free
exercise of religion in New York' 74 and described the right to free
exercise of religion as "not an absolute but rather a preferred
right."' 75 Because the court was construing a corrections statute176
that "implemented" the state constitution's free exercise provision, 177
its decision provides an independent test that applies to free exercise
claims under the New York Constitution.
The court of appeals expanded its independent analysis of the
state provision in Rivera v. Smith.178 In Rivera, a prisoner claimed that
a pat search by a female guard violated his Islamic beliefs and thereby
his free exercise of religion. 179 The prisoner based his claim on the
corrections statute and on the free exercise clause of the New York
168 Between 1972 and 1980 the court of appeals decided six free exercise cases on
federal grounds, denying the claim in each case.- See McCraw, supra note 36, at 694-95 &
nn.100-05 (listing cases).
169 SeeRivera v. Smith, 472 N.E.2d 1015, 1019-20 (N.Y. 1984) (analyzing the right with-
out addressing the Federal Constitution's impact on the statute); Brown v. McGinnis, 180
N.E.2d 791, 792-93 (N.Y. 1962) (analyzing the claim solely under the New York
Constitution).
170 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
171 180 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1962).
172 See id. at 791.
173 Id. at 793.
174 See id. at 792 (noting that New York's free exercise clause excluded "'acts of licen-
tiousness, or... practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state'" (quoting N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 3)).
175 d. at 793 ("Thus freedom of exercise of religious worship... 'cannot interfere with
the laws which the State enacts for its preservation, safety or welfare.'" (quoting People ex
reL Fish v. Sandstrom, 18 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1939))).
176 See N.Y. CoRREar. LAW § 610 (McKinney 1987).
177 Brown, 180 N.E.2d at 792-93.
178 472 N.E.2d 1015 (N.Y. 1984).
179 See id. at 1016.
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Constitution.180 Citing Brown, the court of appeals declared that "pro-
visions of New York law manifest the importance which our State at-
taches to the free exercise of religious beliefs, a liberty interest which
has been called a 'preferred right." ' 1s3 Despite the importance of this
right, the court stated that prison officials may impose reasonable re-
strictions on a prisoner's exercise of religion.'8 2 The court declared
that "such restrictions must be weighed against the institutional needs
and objectives being promoted.' 83 In other words, the court had to
determine whether legitimate state interests outweighed the burden
on the prisoner's religious free exercise.'8 4 The court decided that
the prisoner's free exercise rights outweighed the state's interest in
security and in equal opportunity for female guards.'85 The balance
weighed in favor of the prisoner, even though the court found that a
prisoner's free exercise rights are more restricted than those of some-
one who is not incarcerated.' 86 This result implied the state would
have to show an even greater state interest to override the free exer-
cise rights of a nonprisoner.
The Rivera decision confirmed the basic approach of the New
York Court of Appeals in free exercise cases.' 8 7 Rather than relying
on the "law of general applicability" standard, 8 the court balanced
the claimant's free exercise right against the state's interests. The
court has used this balancing analysis in cases in which it has indepen-
dently considered the state constitution's free exercise clause.' 8 9 Even
180 See id. at 1018.
181 Id. at 1020.
182 See id.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 1020-21.
185 See id. at 1021-22.
186 See id. at 1020.
187 McCraw contends that Rivera is an exceptional case, one that "effectively wrenched
Brown from its legal foundation by misreading the term 'preferred right.'" McCraw, supra
note 36, at 698. Yet the court in Rivera uses the same balancing approach it used in Brown
and other earlier free exercise cases. Compare the test used by the court in Rivera, supra
notes 183-85 and accompanying text, and in Brown, supra note 173 and accompanying text;
also compare the court's language in Rivera with that used in earlier cases, supra notes 132,
138-42, 153-54, 163-64 and accompanying text.
188 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189 In addition to the cases cited in the text of this Note, the court of appeals decided a
line of cases involving free exercise challenges to zoning ordinances and applied a balanc-
ing test that gave great weight to the free exercise claim. See Westchester Reform Temple v.
Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 136 N.E.2d 827
(N.Y. 1956); see also McCraw, supra note 36, at 699-701 (listing cases). The most recent of
these, Cornel University v. Bagnard, 503 N.E.2d 509 (N.Y. 1986), involved a dispute between
a university and a zoning board, but the court of appeals used the case to eviscerate the
previous blanket exemption for religious organizations seeking variances from zoning reg-
ulations. See id. at 514-15. The Bagnardi court concluded that "educational and religious
uses which would unarguably be contrary to the public's health, safety or welfare need not
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though the Supreme Court, in Smith, abandoned the balancing test
for analyzing the Free Exercise Clause, 190 the New York Court of Ap-
peals still is free to consider the appropriate approach under article I,
section 3. The next Part of this Note considers examples of how the
highest courts in other states have analyzed their own free exercise
clauses in the wake of Smith.
IV
HomizoNTAL FEDERALISM: FREE EXERcIsE JURISPRUDENCE IN
OTHER STATES
As the Supreme Court has become less dependable in protecting
constitutional liberties, 191 state courts have become increasingly in-
dependent in interpreting their state constitutions' provisions that
protect civil liberties.192 States' high courts might employ one of four
different analytical methods to interpret state constitutional clauses
protecting rights that also are enumerated in the United States Consti-
tution. 193 If the state court's analysis of parallel provisions differs, it
will be more likely to afford greater protection to a given right under
its constitution than is available under the Federal Constitution. Con-
stitutional interpretations of other states' high courts may become a
benchmark for constitutional decisions in the New York Court of Ap-
peals;'94 thus, interpretations of free exercise provisions from other
states help define the analytical framework the court of appeals would
adopt in interpreting article I, section 3.
be permitted at all." Id. at 515. Although the holding in Bagnardi alters the relative
weights of the state's interests and religious uses in the context of zoning laws, it neverthe-
less requires that courts balance the harm to the community caused by the religious institu-
tion's use of the land against the religious institution's free exercise rights. See id.; LYNN Er
Ai., supra note 1, at 92 (describing the change Bagnardi wrought in New York law).
190 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879; supra Part I.A.
191 See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism: The Interplay of National-State
Standards, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES, supra note 122, at 1, 2; Brennan, supra note 82,
at 546-48.
192 See Brennan, supra note 82, at 548-49; Carmella, supra note 34, at 284-85; see also G.
Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. Rxv. 73, 106-110 (1989) (arguing for
independent review of state constitutional provisions that prohibit the establishment of
religion because the Supreme Court decisions regarding the Establishment Clause are too
inconsistent).
193 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 34, at 1019 (describing the four analytical methods).
194 See, e.g., In reRaquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 427 n.3 (N.Y. 1990) (analogizing the
constitutional validity of other states' paternal rights statutes to a NewYork statute); People
v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 n.2 (N.Y. 1990) (noting with approval other state courts'
interpretations of their state constitutions to prohibit "racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges"); People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1089, 1098 (N.Y. 1985)
(agreeing with the determinations of constitutionality of bookstore closure provisions in
three other states), reu'd, 478 U.S. 697 (1986), affd on state constitutional grounds, 503 N.E.2d
492 (N.Y. 1986).
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A. Four Models of State Court Analysis of Free Exercise Claims
Four models characterize the way that state courts interpret their
own constitutions' free exercise provisions in comparison to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the parallel provision: "lock-
step,"' 95 "interstitial,"19 6 "dual reliance,' 9 7 and "primacy."1 98 Under
the lockstep approach, a state court decides that it will use the Smith
standard, which states that a "neutral law of general applicability" is
constitutional regardless of any incidental burden on the free exercise
of religion, to assess its state constitution's free exercise clause. An
example of the lockstep approach appears in the Tennessee case State
v. Loudon,' 99 in which the free exercise claimant challenged a state law
that required him to present his social security number when applying
for a driver's license. 200 The court "disregarded the import of prior
state constitutional precedents, and tied its analysis entirely to the
United States Supreme Court's most recent free exercise
decisions."20 1
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the interstitial ap-
proach to deciding free exercise cases. Under this approach, the
court first looks to the Constitution to determine whether it affords
protection to the claimant and analyzes the claim under the state con-
stitution if and only if the Federal Constitution provides no protec-
tion.20 2 For example, in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray
High Schoo420 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court first assessed the facts
under the federal standard 20 4 and only examined the claim under its
own constitution after finding that the Federal Constitution offered
195 Levy, supra note 34, at 1035. Under a lockstep approach, a state court "allows the
United States Supreme Court to 'dictate the content of state constitutional doctrine.'" Id.
(quoting Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALs AM. ACAD.
POL & Soc. Sci. 98, 104 (1988)).
196 Id. The interstitial approach "look[s] first to the federal free exercise standard,"
id., and only then analyzes whether the state constitution provides a different level of pro-
tection. See id. at 1040.
197 Id. at 1040. A dual reliance analysis "moves beyond this extreme deference to fed-
eral constitutional interpretation.... reflect[ing] the view that state and federal courts
should work together 'in a partnership for the protection of individual rights.'" Id. (quot-
ing Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the
Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REv. 977, 979 (1985)).
198 Id. at 1044. A primacy approach determines the state's constitutional protection
for a right before assessing the federal standard. See id. at 1044-45.
199 857 S.W.2d 878 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1993); see also Levy, supra note 34, at 1033-35
(discussing Loudon).
200 See Loudon, 857 S.W.2d at 882-83.
201 Levy, supra note 34, at 1035.
202 See id. at 1039-40.
203 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
204 But cf State v Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Minn. 1990) (determining
that the Minnesota free exercise clause afforded greater protection than the federal
clause).
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no protection.205 This approach treats the Federal Constitution as the
primary protector of rights and the state constitution as the secondary
protector.206
The Washington Supreme Court, in First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle, adopted the dual reliance approach, which simultaneously con-
siders both the federal standard and the state constitution.207 The
supreme court's analysis of the state clause under the dual reliance
standard was more thorough than Minnesota's was under the intersti-
tial model. Washington's dual reliance approach considered six fac-
tors in determining that the state constitution mandated a compelling
state interest to override a free exercise claim. 20 Because the Wash-
ington Supreme Court found for the claimant under the federal stan-
dard, however, its full consideration of the state constitutional
provision arguably was unnecessary.
A primacy approach permits a state court to declare that a right
has protection under the state constitution without considering the
federal standard.209 At least four states have adopted the primacy ap-
proach since the Supreme Court decided Smith.210 In Massachusetts,
the Supreme Judicial Court relied exclusively on the state constitution
to uphold a free exercise claim made by a church seeking a religious
205 See Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers, 487 N.W.2d at 862-67; see also Levy, supra note 34, at
1039 (discussing Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers).
206 See Levy, supra note 34, at 1040; see also Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional
Theory and State Courts, 18 CA. L. REv. 165, 177 (1984) ("The effect [of this approach] is to
make independent state grounds appear not as original state law, but as a kind of supple-
mental rights that require an explanation.").
207 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); see also Levy, supra note 34, at 1042-44 (discussing First
Covenant Church).
208 See Levy, supra note 34, at 1042-44. The six factors the court considered in deciding
whether the Washington Constitution extended broader rights than the Federal Constitu-
tion were: "1. The textual language of the state constitution; 2. Significant differences in
the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; 3. State constitutional
and common-law history; 4. Preexisting bodies of state law, including statutory law; 5. Dif-
ferences in structure between the federal and the state constitutions; and 6. Matters of
particular state interest or local concern." First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 185-86 (citing
State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986)).
209 See Levy, supra note 34, at 1044.
210 See id. at 1045-50. The states are Montana, Massachusetts, Maine, and Oregon. See
id. California appears to take the same approach, declaring in a recent case that assessed
both federal and state free exercise claims that
[w]e may take it for granted that the meaning of article I, section 4, of
the California Constitution is not dependent on the meaning of any provi-
sion of the federal Constitution. . . . "Respect for our Constitution as 'a
document of independent force' forbids us to abandon settled applications
of its terms every time changes are announced in the interpretation of the
federal charter."
Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 930 (Cal. 1996) (citations
omitted). The court then declined to decide the issues raised under the state constitution;
rather, it used the RFRA standard, which it saw as equal to the highest standard available
under the California Constitution. See id. at 930-31.
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freedom exemption from a historical landmarks ordinance.21' The
court did not discuss how the federal free exercise standard might
apply.212
New York Court of Appeals precedents in other civil liberties
cases213 as well as explicit statements the court has made when inter-
preting parallel constitutional provisions, strongly suggest that the
court of appeals would interpret article I, section 3 more broadly than
would the Supreme Court. In a 1988 case involving ajournalist's privi-
lege to protect photographs from disclosure, the court stated that
[o]ur decision is based on an adequate and independent
ground under our State Constitution. Nevertheless, we are noting
our agreement with the Federal courts that have reached the same
result under the Federal Constitution in order that we might ex-
press our own view of the federal guarantee of a free press which, of
course, we are also bound to uphold. This practice is in accord with
our proper role in helping to expound the Federal, as well as our
State, Constitution .... 214
The journalist presented the court with free speech claims under both
the New York and Federal Constitutions, but the court decided the
case solely under the New York Constitution, while only "noting" that
it would have reached the same result under the federal provisions.21 5
Judge (now Chief Judge) Kaye concurred with the opinion, stating,
however, that she believed "the case is correctly resolved under the
State Constitution alone."21 6
The court of appeals has also interpreted the New York Constitu-
tion independently of the Federal Constitution in a number of other
cases by using either a primacy or dual reliance analysis.217 In fact, the
last time the court of appeals applied the state free exercise provision,
211 See Society ofJesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); see
also Levy, supra note 34, at 1045-46 (discussing Society ofJesus).
212 See Society ofJesus, 564 N.E.2d at 574.
213 See infra Part V.
214 O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 278 (N.Y. 1988).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 282 (Kaye, J., concurring).
217 See, e.g., Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 510 N.E.2d
325, 328 (N.Y. 1987) (using the dual reliance standard because the plaintiffs' claims, which
maintained that mandatory blood tests interfered with their right to privacy, dealt with
public employees' expectation of privacy, an important state constitutional issue); People
v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 912 n.* (N.Y. 1987) (employing a dual reliance analysis and decid-
ing that the "inevitable discovery" exception to the evidentiary exclusionary rule would be
the same under both federal and state law); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986)
(using a primacy analysis to determine that state due process rights of an involuntarily
committed mental patient were violated); People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629 (N.Y.
1963) (holding, under a primacy approach, that the strong state constitutional protection
against self-incrimination was sufficient grounds to decide the case without discussing fed-
eral constitutional safeguards).
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it did not consider the outcome under the federal standard.218
Although the court has used a variety of analytical approaches for in-
terpreting parallel provisions,219 issues involving significant language
differences between the state and federal constitutions, unsettled fed-
eral law, and a balancing of individual interests against state interests
are particularly suited for resolution under the state constitution
alone. 220 This reasoning suggests that the court of appeals would
adopt a primacy approach when analyzing a free exercise claim under
the New York Constitution.
How a state court compares its free exercise clause to that of the
Constitution does not necessarily determine what standard of scrutiny
a court will apply. For example, Minnesota maintains a compelling
interest standard for free exercise claims under the state constitution,
even though it first considers the claim under the federal standard.221
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court found the "law of general appli-
cability" standard independently appropriate under its constitution,
although other states that have adopted a similar primacy approach
maintain a higher level of scrutiny.222 It is evident that the primacy
approach affords a state's highest court the most flexibility to inter-
pret its constitution without regard to what the Federal Constitution
provides on an issue.223 The jurisprudential independence of the
New York Court of Appeals224 gives it substantial leeway to develop a
standard for analyzing free exercise claims that departs from the Smith
standard.
218 See Rivera v. Smith, 472 N.E.2d 1015, 1019-20 (N.Y. 1984) (mentioning the Federal
Constitution in passing, but analyzing the case under the state constitution).
219 See OWeill 523 N.E.2d at 282 (Kaye, J., concurring) ("[I]n resolving issues raised
under parallel provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions, this court has not been
wedded to any particular methodology.").
220 See id. (Kaye, J., concurring); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and
Prindpk 61 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 399, 420 (1987) (noting that "there may in particular in-
stances be principled basis for broader protection within this State").
221 See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
222 See Carmella, supra note 34, at 303-05; Levy, supra note 34, at 1047-50.
223 Under the doctrine of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court
will not review cases that a state court has decided on "adequate and independent state
grounds" in deciding whether that case implicates both state and federal rights, as long as
the state court relies explicitly on state law in its decision. Id. at 104142. Therefore, a state
court that adopts a primacy approach is free to develop its state constitutional law without
reference to the analogous federal provision. Of course, a state court could not decide in
an area of civil liberties to apply the lower protection of a state constitution to a claimant in
which a higher protection afforded by the Federal Constitution reaches state actions
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
224 See infra Part V.
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B. Indications of How the New York Court of Appeals Would
Analyze a Free Exercise Claim
Which standard a court chooses to analyze a state constitutional
protection depends on a historical analysis of the constitutional provi-
sion, differences in text between the state and federal constitutions, 225
and state precedent.226 In addition, courts may consider precedents
from other states that have analyzed their own constitutional provi-
sions, particularly if the language of the states' constitutions is simi-
lar.22 7 The NewYork Court of Appeals has applied all of these factors
in cases considering whether a state constitutional provision offers
more protection to a civil liberty than does the analogous federal
provision. 228
No sources that indicate the legislative intent behind article I, sec-
tion 3 are available. 229 Nevertheless, the historical evidence of reli-
gious toleration during the colony's early years,230 and the breadth of
the free exercise provision which the Constitutional Convention of
1777 adopted after significant debate,231 suggest that New York's free
exercise provision should be read broadly to protect religious free-
dom.232 Although the precedents in the court of appeals indicate that
it usually rejects free exercise claims,233 a full assessment of the histori-
cal evidence is consistent with the court's statement in its most recent
free exercise case that article I, section 3 "manifest[s] the importance
which our State attaches to the free exercise of religious beliefs."234
The textual differences between article I, section 3 and the Free
Exercise Clause are pronounced. 235 The language of the New York
225 See Kaye, supra note 220, at 412; Levy, supra note 34, at 1032.
226 See Levy, supra note 34, at 1034-36, 1043.
227 See ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 122, at viii. Commentators have noted:
In many instances the wording of the constitutional clause will control the
outcome.... [M]any of the states have identically worded clauses. In such
a case, an interpretation given a constitutional clause in one state may very
well provide a clue as to how the court in a neighboring state would react.
Id.
228 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text; infra Parts V, VI.B.
229 See ROBERT ALLAN CARTER, NEwYoRK STATE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE
INTENT 3 (1988) (reporting that article I, section 3 had "[n]o statement of legislative
intent").
230 See supra Part II.A.
231 See supra Part II.B.
232 See GALIE, supra note 92, at 50.
233 See GALIE, supra note 98, at 38; McCraw, supra note 36, at 685-96.
234 Rivera v. Smith, 472 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 (N.Y. 1984).
235 The New York Constitution's free exercise clause reads:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state
to all mankind; ... but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsis-
tent with the peace or safety of this state.
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provision's first clause is more expansive, protecting the free exercise
of "religious profession and worship, without discrimination or prefer-
ence,"23 6 whereas the Federal Constitution simply protects "reli-
gion."23 7 Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, the New York provision is
not facially limited to protection against government action.238 An-
other important difference is that the NewYork Constitution expressly
limits the expansive rights that the first clause recognizes; the Federal
Constitution speaks in absolute terms.23 9 These significant textual dif-
ferences strongly suggest the New York Constitution's free exercise
provision be interpreted differently than the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the federal clause.
The court of appeals would also consider other high courts' con-
stitutional interpretations as a source of authority for interpreting
New York's free exercise clause because it has considered various
states' constitutional jurisprudence in other civil liberties cases.2 40
Differences between the language of state constitutions and of the
Federal Constitution have factored prominently into state courts'
analyses of free exercise claims since Smith.241 Several states that have
decided their constitutions mandate a higher level of scrutiny than
the federal standard in Smith have provisions in their constitutions ex-
plicitly limiting the free exercise of religion by providing that the free
exercise must not interfere with the "public peace" or the "peace and
safety of the state."242 States that have adopted a standard similar to
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. In contrast, the Federal Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... " U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
236 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
237 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
238 See GAMIE, supra note 98, at 38. But cf. Zlotowitz v. Jewish Hospital, 84 N.Y.S.2d 61,
63 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (interpreting the free exercise provision to apply only to governmental
action).
239 See GALIE, supra note 98, at 38. According to Galie, this limitation "mandates bal-
ancing the free exercise of religious liberty against the interests of the state in preserving
the peace and welfare of the community." Id.
240 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1140 (N.Y. 1996) (discussing the similarity
of a New York constitutional provision with provisions in the Federal Constitution and
other state constitutions); People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 n.2 (N.Y. 1990) (noting
that a court of appeals's decision regarding racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
was consistent with other states' constitutional interpretations).
241 See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 400 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J.,
concurring) (noting the state's "peace or safety" provision, which is absent from the Fed-
eral Constitution); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185-86 (Wash.
1992) (en banc) (noting that the Washington Constitution is more expansive than the
Federal Constitution).
242 CarmelIa, supra note 34, at 280-81 (internal quotation marks omitted). The states
are Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Washington. See ME. CONST. art 1, § 3; MAss.
CoNsr. pt. I, art. II; MrNN. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 11. A total of 21 states
have this limitation in their state constitution. See Miller & Sheers, supra note 122, at 322
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that in Smith have no balancing provisions.243 In particular, decisions
involving the limitation clauses of the Washington and Minnesota
Constitutions, which are identical to and were copied from the New
York Constitution, which predates both, would be persuasive. 244 Be-
cause of these distinctions, it is reasonable to conclude that the New
York Constitution also textually requires a balancing approach to de-
ciding free exercise claims and may well require a test closer to the
"compelling interest" test, which courts currently apply in Minnesota,
Washington, Maine, and Massachusetts.
If the New York Court of Appeals decides to develop an in-
dependent free exercise jurisprudence, it would not be taking an un-
precedented step. The next Part of this Note examines several cases
that represent areas in which the court of appeals has held that a pro-
vision of the New York Constitution should be interpreted differently
than its analogue in the Federal Constitution.
V
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALs PROTECTIONS FOR OTHER
INDMDUAL LIBERTIEs
The New York Court of Appeals often parts company with the
Supreme Court when it interprets state constitutional provisions that
parallel those in the Federal Constitution. 245 The court stated that it
tbl.2. Miller and Sheers erroneously report that 22 states have this limitation, but Iowa,
which they include, does not. See Carmella, supra note 34, at 309 & n.158.
243 These states are Iowa, Oregon, Tennessee, and Vermont. See IowA CONST. art. I,
§ 3; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3; TENN. CONST. art I, § 3; VT. CONsr. ch. 1, art. 3; Carmella,
supra note 34, at 307-09 (describing the Oregon decision in Smith v. Employment Div., 799
P.2d 148 (Or. 1990), remand by 494 U.S. 872 (1990); the Vermont decision in State v. De-
LaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990); and the Iowa decision in Hope Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 463 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1990)); Levy, supra note 34,
at 1033-35 (describing the Tennessee decision in State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d 878 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1993)). The supreme courts of two other states that have constitutions without
balancing provisions have instead adopted a compelling interest analysis under their state
constitutions. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281 (Alaska
1994); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239-40 (Wis. 1996).
244 See MiNN. CONsT. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; see also First Covenant Church,
840 P.2d at 187 (finding that a state infringement on a citizen's free exercise of religion
can be justified only by showing a "compelling state interest" under the state constitution);
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 398 (determining that a "compelling state interest" test applies
to free exercise claims under the state constitution).
245 See, e.g., GAUJE, supra note 98, at 44, 46, 48, 52, 60-61 (discussing various court of
appeals decisions that have granted greater protection to the rights to counsel, against self-
incrimination, to due process of law, of the freedom of the press, and to be protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the New York Constitution); see also People v.
Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (N.Y. 1991) (describing the right-to-counsel clause of the
New York Constitution, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, as being "far more expansive than the Fed-
eral counterpart" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Doe v. Coughlin, 518
N.E.2d 536, 553 (N.Y. 1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting) (noting that "this court has fre-
quently enforced the protection of individual rights under our State Constitution even
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is "bound to exercise its independent judgment" when it considers
constitutional law issues, 24 6 and it expressly "decline [d] to adopt any
rigid method of analysis which would, except in unusual circum-
stances, require [it] to interpret provisions of the State Constitution in
'Lockstep' with the Supreme Court's interpretations of similarly
worded provisions of the Federal Constitution."247 The court stated
that it usually must "analyze the particular case and the Federal consti-
tutional rule at issue.., in order to determine whether under estab-
lished New York law and traditions some greater degree of protection
must be given."248
In People v. Scott,249 the court of appeals considered both the state
and the federal constitutional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.250 At issue was the scope of the state constitu-
tional protection from searches and seizures on a person's private
property beyond the curtilage of the person's house or other struc-
tures. 251 The Supreme Court standard limited the Fourth Amend-
ment protection to those areas of the property where a person has a
"legitimate expectation of privacy."252 The property beyond the curti-
lage, or "open fields" on a property, is not within the sphere in which
one has an expectation of privacy and therefore is not protected
under the Fourth Amendment.253 The New York Court of Appeals
decided that the New York Constitution's protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures254 immunizes owners of property from
warrantless searches and seizures in areas beyond their homes and
other structures. This interpretation gives a much higher level of pro-
tection than the Federal Constitution.255
where the Federal Constitution either did not or might not afford such protection" and
that it has not "hesitated to accord to individuals protection under our State Constitution
from governmental intrusion into intimate and private aspects of their lives").
246 People v. Barber, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1943). See supra notes 160-64 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of this case. For later court of appeals cases that cited the
language in Barber with approval, see, for example, People v. Alvarez, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899
(N.Y. 1987), and People ex re. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494 (N.Y. 1986).
247 People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 1992).
248 Id.
249 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992). The decision consolidated two cases involving the
construction of article I, section 12 of the NewYork Constitution. See id. at 1330-39; People
v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1339-46 (N.Y. 1992).
250 See Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1330-38.
251 See id. at 1330. The defendant was convicted of growing marijuana on his property
after an investigator and a helpful citizen made several unauthorized, warrantless entries
onto the property to verify the presence of the marijuana before deciding to obtain a
warrant. See id.
252 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
253 See id. at 182-84.
254 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
255 See Scot4 593 N.E.2d at 1338.
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The court of appeals has also offered more protection for a crimi-
nal defendant's right to counsel under the New York Constitution
than the Supreme Court has under the Federal Constitution.2 56 The
claimants in People v. Harris257 asked the court of appeals whether the
state constitutional protection against unlawful searches and seizures
requires the suppression of a criminal defendant's statement at a po-
lice station following his arrest by policemen who unlawfully had en-
tered his apartment.258 The United States Supreme Court had
previously ruled in this case that the statement should not be sup-
pressed under the Fourth Amendment because the statement at the
police stationand the illegal entry had no causal connection and the
officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, even though they
had no warrant.259 On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the statement must be suppressed on state constitutional
grounds.2 60 An important underpinning of this decision is the dispar-
ity between federal and state law on when the defendant's right to
counsel attaches. Under NewYork law, it attaches "once an arrest war-
rant is authorized." 261 The court of appeals noted that under federal
law, police do not violate a suspect's right to counsel if they simply
interrogate the suspect without a lawyer present.262 In determining
that the New York standard was higher than the federal standard, the
court stated that
[t]he safeguards guaranteed by this State's Right to Counsel
Clause are unique (N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6). By constitutional and
statutory interpretation, we have established a protective body of law
in this area resting on concerns of due process, self-incrimination
and the right to counsel provisions of the State Constitution which
is substantially greater than that recognized by other State jurisdic-
tions and "far more expansive than the Federal counterpart." The
Court has described the New York rule as a "cherished principle",
rooted in this State's prerevolutionary constitutional law and devel-
oped "independent of its Federal counterpart."2 63
The court of appeals has treated free speech issues similarly. In
O'Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc., 264 the court of appeals noted that
"[t]he protection afforded by the guarantees of free press and speech
in the New York Constitution is often broader than the minimum re-
256 See GAUE, supra note 98, at 44 (noting that "the right-to-counsel protection in New
York is the most expansive in the nation").
257 570 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1991).
258 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; Harris, 570 N.E.2d at 1051-52.
259 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990).
260 See Harris, 570 N.E.2d at 1055.
261 Id. at 1054.
262 See id.
263 Id. (citations omitted).
264 523 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1988).
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quired by the First Amendment."265 The court analyzed separately
the relevant state constitutional protection and the parallel'federal
provisions.26 6 Ultimately, the court decided the case on "an adequate
and independent state ground under our State Constitution. '267 In
discussing the relative protections that the state and federal constitu-
tions afford to First Amendment rights, the court reasoned that
[tlhe expansive language of our State constitutional guarantee, its
formulation and adoption prior to the Supreme Court's application
of the First Amendment'to the States, the recognition in very early
New York history of a constitutionally guaranteed liberty of the
press, and the consistent tiadition in this State of providing, the
broadest possible protection to "the sensitive role of gathering and
disseminating news of public events" all call for particular vigilance
by the courts of this State in safeguarding the free press against un-
due interference. 268
The court of appeals often cites to these factors to support an in-
dependent state constitutional jurisprudence.2 69
In People v. P.J. Video,270 the court of appeals decided that the
showing required to attain probable cause to issue a search warrant
under the New York Constitution is greater than that required under
the Federal Constitution.2 7' The Court also set out several factors that
it may consider when determining the protection that the state consti-
tution affords relative to the Federal Constitution.2 72 One factor is an
"interpretive" analysis of the textual differences between the state con-
stitutional provision and the parallel federal provision. 273 This inter-
pretive analysis may identify rights enumerated under the state
constitution that are not present in the Federal Constitution 274 or de-
clare the language of the state constitution "sufficiently unique to sup-
port a broader interpretation of the individual right."275 The history
of the state provision may indicate that it is meant to be broader than
the federal clause, and the structure and purpose of the state constitu-
265 Id. at 280 n.3.
266 See id. at 278, 280-81; see also supra notes 197, 207-08 and accompanying text
(describing an example of the dual reliance method of analysis in First Covenant Church v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992)).
267 O'eil 523 N.E.2d at 278.
268 Id. at 280-81 (citations and footnotes omitted).
269 See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277-78 (N.Y. 1991); People
v. Alvarez, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899 (N.Y. 1987); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560-
61 (N.Y. 1986).
270 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986).
271 See id. at 563.
272 See id. at 560-61.





don can provide insight into how strongly it protects rights.276 The
court distinguished these from "noninterpretive" factors, which
attempt
to discover... any preexisting State statutory or common law defin-
ing the scope of the individual right in question; the history and
traditions of the State in its protection of the individual right; any
identification of the right in the State Constitution as being one of
peculiar State or local concern; and any distinctive attitudes of the
State citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the indi-
vidual right.2 77
The court of appeals has also indicated that it will consider the
consistency of Supreme Court jurisprudence in deciding the level of
state constitutional protection: "An independent construction of our
own State Constitution is particularly appropriate where a sharp or
sudden change in direction by the United States Supreme Court dra-
matically narrows fundamental constitutional rights that our citizens
have long assumed to be part of their birthright."278 The court of
appeals has held that such a change in Supreme Courtjurisprudence
is a significant motivation to extend greater protection under the New
York Constitution.279 The drastic shift and consequent narrowing of
the scope of liberty in the Supreme Court's religious free exercise ju-
risprudence 280 offers the court of appeals such a "particularly appro-
priate" situation.
The next Part of this Note considers recent lower court cases in
New York that have attempted to apply state constitutional jurispru-
dence to free exercise claims. It also predicts what approach the court
of appeals would likely take if it heard a free exercise claim under the
New York Constitution in light of the changes in federal free exercise
interpretation, the history of religious freedom in New York, and the
court's precedents in this area and for other civil liberties.
276 See id.
277 Id.
278 People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1342 (N.Y. 1992).
279 See P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d at 562 (imposing a higher standard for New York after
stating that "[w]e see the Supreme Court's present ruling as a... dilution of the require-
ments ofjudicial supervision in the warrant process and as a departure from prior law on
the subject").
280 See supra Part I.
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VI
TE CURRENT STATE OF FREE EXERCISE IN NEW YORK AND ITS
RELEVANCE FOR INDIVIDUALS BRINGING FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
A. Recent Interpretations of Article I, Section 3 in Lower Courts
and Federal Courts in New York
Lower courts in New York have analyzed several cases 28' under
article I, section 3 since the court of appeals's last free exercise deci-
sion in Rivera v. Smith.282 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has also applied the New York free ex-
ercise provision in two recent cases.283 These cases indicate that these
courts' current understanding of the New York Court of Appeals juris-
prudence in the area of state constitutional free exercise is
inconsistent.
In Bunny v. Coughlin,284 the appellate division addressed an in-
mate's free exercise claim. The appellant claimed that the New York
Department of Correctional Services violated his free exercise of reli-
gion by prohibiting him from wearing his Rastafarian religious crown
and by not permitting him to eat a special diet consonant with his
religious beliefs.28 5 Citing a court of appeals case that upheld a re-
striction on prisoner's free speech rights upon a finding of a "legiti-
mate penological goal,"28 6 the appellate division decided that a higher
level of scrutiny was not appropriate in adjudicating a prisoner's free
exercise claim.287 As a result, the court denied the prisoner's
claims.288
In Rourke v. New York State Department of Correctional Service2 89 the
supreme court clearly stated its view of and the applicable test under
the state constitutional free exercise provision. The case involved a
281 See, e.g., Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 1997); Rourke v. NewYork
State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (App. Div. 1994); Bunny v. Coughlin,
593 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 1993);Jackson v. Coughlin, 595 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1993);
In re Miller, 656 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Allegany County Ct. 1997).
282 472 N.E.2d 1015 (N.Y. 1984). The court of appeals has applied the Free Exercise
Clause in a few cases since 1984. See, e.g., New York State Employment Relations Bd. v.
Christ the King Reg'l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (N.Y. 1997); Ware v. Valley Stream
High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426-30 (N.Y. 1989). In two cases, the court has specifically
noted that the plaintiffs had not submitted a claim under the state free exercise clause. See
Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 186 (N.Y. 1994); War 550 N.E.2d at 426 n.3.
283 See Muhammad v. City of New York Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 161
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
284 593 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 1993).
285 See id. at 356.
286 Lucas v. Scully, 521 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (N.Y. 1988).
287 See Bunny v. Coughlin, 593 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (App. Div. 1993).
288 See id at 360.
289 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1993), affjd 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (App. Div. 1994). The
author is grateful to Professors Glenn Galbreath and Gary Simson, Co-Directors of the
Cornell Law School Religious Liberties Clinic, for making available to him the briefs they
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free exercise claim by a Mohawk corrections officer who was fired be-
cause he refused to comply with regulations and written directives or-
dering him to cut his hair.290 The claimant belonged to the
Longhouse religion, in which not cutting one's hair "symbolizes spiri-
tuality."291 In finding that the claimant's state constitutional right to
free exercise outweighed the state's interests in order and discipline
among guards, the court articulated its understanding that the New
York Constitution requires a compelling interest balancing test.292
The supreme court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Smith, but stated that it could not
ignore the New York Court of Appeals' long history and commit-
ment to the protection of individual rights and liberties beyond
those afforded by the U.S. Constitution, and federal constitutional
law. Given this history and commitment ... and the importance of
this free exercise right, it is hard to imagine that New York would
not continue to apply a "strict scrutiny" standard of review, and a
balancing of the state's competing interests and the fundamental
rights of the individual.293
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the decision, but appeared
to suggest a more lenient balancing test.294 The court determined
that the state had failed "to demonstrate that requiring petitioner to
comply with the policy further[ed] a legitimate State interest which
outweigh[ed] the negative impact upon his religious freedom," but
failed to outline further the applicable test.295 Both the trial court's
strict scrutiny standard and the appellate division's balancing test are
more protective than the federal free exercise standard in Smith. A
court applying the Smith standard could not grant an exemption to
the generally applicable hair regulation solely on the basis that the
regulation violated the claimant's right to free exercise of his reli-
gion.2 96 The application of any test under the state constitution that
requires a court to weigh the burden on religious freedom against the
strength of the state's interest in imposing such a burden represents a
substantially greater opportunity for religious-exemption seekers than
does the rule in Smith.
submitted in Rourke, which were of great assistance in thinking about the issues discussed
in this Note.
290 See id, at 648.
291 Id.
292 See id. at 649-50.
293 Id.
294 See Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472
(App. Div. 1994).
295 Id.
296 If the claimant could show that the regulation violated both the Free Exercise
Clause and another constitutional right, the regulation might be unconstitutional as one of
the "hybrid" situations recognized in Smith. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has expressed uncertainty regarding the appropriate test for a
free exercise claim under New York law.297 After declaring that
"[w]ith respect to the plaintiffs' free exercise claim under the New
York State Constitution, the appropriate test to be applied is not
clear,"298 the district court discussed both the supreme court's hold-
ing in Rourke and the appellate division's affirmance. The district
court ultimately declined to articulate which standard of review it
should apply.299
In an interesting application of the state constitution's free exer-
cise clause, the court in In re Miller recently authorized a religious ex-
emption to a requirement that an applicant for a pistol permit must
submit a photograph.300 An Amish man refused to allow himself to be
photographed for the permit on the ground that being photographed
was against his religion.30 ' In lieu of a photograph, he offered to al-
low himself to be fingerprinted.302 The court balanced "the impor-
tance of the right asserted" against the governmental "needs and
objectives being promoted"303 and concluded that the defendant's
right to free exercise justified an exemption from the photograph re-
quirement. 30 4 Although the court did not explicitly spell out a com-
pelling interest test, it did note that "the Assistant Attorney General
has argued very ably and cogently that the State's interests in requir-
ing a photograph are 'compelling,' extending beyond mere adminis-
trative convenience."30 5 Nevertheless, the court decided that the
applicant's free exercise interest outweighed these compelling state
interests because a less restrictive means of identification was
available.3 06
From these recent lower court applications of the New York free
exercise clause, which postdate the court of appeals's Rivera decision,
it appears that no clear precedent outlines what degree of scrutiny
should apply in free exercise cases. However, all of the cases indicate
that a balancing of interests, now apparently abandoned at the federal
level,307 is necessary to assess free exercise claims under the New York
Constitution. The following section of this Note considers how the
297 See Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
298 Id. (footnote omitted).
299 See id. at 579-80.
300 See In re Miller, 656 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849 (Allegany Co. Ct. 1997).
301 See id. at 846.
302 See id. at 848.
303 Id. at 847 (quoting Lucas v. Scully, 521 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (N.Y. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
304 See id. at 849.
305 Id. at 848.
306 See id. at 849.
307 See supra Part I.
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court of appeals would most likely analyze a free exercise claim
brought under the New York Constitution.
B. Article I, Section 3: The New York Court of Appeals's Likely
Approach
The New York Court of Appeals has actively participated in the
increased level of judicial federalism over the past two decades. 308 Its
decisions have provided higher levels of protection for a variety of
constitutionally guaranteed liberties under the New York Constitution
than the Federal Constitution affords.8 0 9 In assessing state free exer-
cise claims, the court of appeals has consistently applied a test that
balances the claimant's interest in the free exercise of religion against
the state's interests in protecting society.310 Numerous reasons indi-
cate that the court of appeals would maintain this approach to the
state free exercise clause despite the sea-change in federal free exer-
cise jurisprudence and that it would afford greater protection to reli-
gious freedom under the state constitution than is currently available
under the Federal Constitution.
An interpretive analysis3l ' of the New York free exercise provision
indicates that its structure explicitly contemplates balancing the "free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship" with the
"peace or safety of this state."3 12 In addition, the New York Constitu-
tion speaks more broadly of the free exercise right, before it limits
that right by the final clause, than does the Federal Constitution.313
Other states with similar or identical limiting language in their free
exercise clauses have interpreted these clauses to require a "compel-
ling interest" test similar to that in federal jurisprudence prior to
Smith.314
A noninterpretive analysis315 of article I, section 3, which focuses
on the policy, history, and tradition of the provision, also suggests that
the provision requires a heightened protection of religious freedom.
Colonial New York was a haven of tolerance for several different reli-
gious groups, and the state generally avoided an establishment of a
particular religion.3 16 The first state constitution provided the
broadest freedom of religion provision of any of the original states.317
308 See supra Part V.
309 See supra Part V.
310 See supra Part III.
311 See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
312 N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 3; see supra Part II.B.
313 See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
314 See supra Part IV.
315 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
316 See supra Part II.A.
317 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The variety of religious groups within the state and the clear evidence
from the Constitutional Convention that even the free exercise rights
of unpopular religious groups were to enjoy protection 318 indicate
that the right to free exercise is "one of peculiar State or local con-
cern," 319 which evinces "distinctive attitudes of the State citizenry to-
ward the definition, scope or protection of the individual right."320
Furthermore, in interpreting the Minnesota free exercise clause,
which was identical to and derived from the New York Constitution,
the Minnesota Supreme Court considered New York's history of reli-
gious freedom and concluded that a compelling interest test was
appropriate. 321
The New York Court of Appeals has frequently stated that it is
willing to look first to the state constitution for the protection of indi-
vidual liberties.3 22 Because the Supreme Court has drastically cur-
tailed the availability of free exercise exemptions under the First
Amendment, the court of appeals should be open to the application
of a higher standard of scrutiny under the New York Constitution.3 23
Older New York precedents rejected most free exercise claims under
the state constitution, just as the Supreme Court rejected most claims
in which it purported to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test.3 24
Yet the most recent precedent available in New York, Rivera, indicates
that the New York Court of Appeals is willing to offer free exercise
exemptions from generally applicable laws under article I, section
3.325 Taken together, these factors indicate that the New York Court
of Appeals probably would depart from the current federal free exer-
cise standard and grant a claimant a broader free exercise right under
the New York Constitution and would have strong grounds for an-
nouncing a compelling interest test. By granting free exercise exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws under the New York Constitution,
the court of appeals would be fulfilling the letter and spirit of article I,
section 3 in a way that the Supreme Court has rejected to the detri-
ment of religious liberty at the federal level.
318 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
319 People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986).
320 Id.
321 See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J.,
concurring).
322 See supra Part V.
323 See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
324 See GALE, supra note 98, at 38; McConnell, supra note 24, at 1127.
325 See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
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C. The Value of Free Exercise Claims Under the New York
Constitution
The Supreme Court's approach in Smith wrenched the Free Exer-
cise Clause from its historic underpinnings and rejected the idea that
religious practice, standing alone, may justify an exemption from a
generally applicable law. The New York Constitution, as the New York
Court of Appeals would likely interpret it, provides a better means of
protecting the rights of religious minorities against the majoritarian
state than does the Free Exercise Clause under the Smith standard.
Likewise, a preferable interpretation of article I, section 3 is one that
ensures that a court will weigh the burden on religious freedom
against the state's interests. This interpretation is both more conso-
nant with the historical origin of free exercise clauses and more likely
to make these clauses meaningful in protecting religious freedom as a
unique right.32 6 Individuals who seek vindication of their free exer-
cise rights are more likely to succeed when their religious freedom
interest is balanced against the state's interests than when that interest
is overridden by a law of general applicability, even when the burden
is great and the cost of accommodation to the state is insignificant.3 27
The value to a litigant of the state standard as compared to the
federal standard can be illustrated by applying both to the facts of
several free exercise claims. The Amish pistol permit applicant in In re
Miller succeeded under the compelling interest balancing test, which
the New York trial court applied to his state free exercise claim.3 28 A
court applying the Smith standard to the same facts would find that
the pistol permit law is a neutral law of general applicability and con-
sequenfly that the free exercise claim must fail. Miller would face the
choice of foregoing his permit or acting against his religious beliefs.
The guard who challenged prison hair-length regulations in
Rourke also prevailed under the state constitution. 329 A federal free
exercise analysis under Smith would require the guard to cut his hair
because the regulation is neutral toward religion and is generally ap-
plicable to all prison guards in New York.330 The state constitutional
analyses, both the compelling interest test the trial court applied and
the less-strict balancing test applied on appeal, gave this claimant an
exemption from the regulation to protect his freedom of religion.33 i
326 See supra Part II.
327 See Carmella, supra note 34, at 325; Laycock, supra note 5, at 15.
328 See In re Miller, 656 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49 (Allegany Co. Ct. 1997); supra notes 300-06
and accompanying text.
329 See Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472
(App. Div. 1994); supra notes 289-96 and accompanying text.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 289-96.
331 See Rourke, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 472; supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
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In a case decided without the balancing test, Muslim street ven-
dors were prohibited from selling perfumed oils and incense without
a vendor license.332 The plaintiffs contended that the oils and incense
were important to the practice of their religion, while the City
presented extensive evidence that these items are merely recom-
mended for Islamic prayer. 333 The federal district court held that
"this issue is not a material fact for purposes of deciding the instant
motion.133 4 After finding that the vendor law was a valid, neutral law
of general applicability, the court held that the law's "application to
plaintiffs' vending activity arguably impinges on their religious prac-
tice. As such, the vending regulations fall squarely within the holding
of Smith, and raise no free exercise claim.13 3 5 Had the plaintiffs also
brought a claim under New York's free exercise clause, the district
court would have had to at least balance the interests at stake by deter-
mining whether the City's interest in requiring vendors to obtain per-
mits outweighed the plaintiffs' interests in offering items of religious
significance to their fellow believers. While a court might have found
for the City on either a rational basis or a compelling interest ground,
the plaintiffs would have had an opportunity-one they would not
have under the Smith test-to show how governmental action bur-
dened their sincere beliefs.
People pursuing free exercise claims involving state acts should
make a claim based on article I, section 3 in addition to any federal
free exercise claim they might make. By invoking the state constitu-
tion, the claimant will receive an opportunity to balance his or her
religious liberty interest against the state's interests and can probably
force the state to prove a compelling interest to defeat the claim. 336
Individuals who neglect the state free exercise claim risk being left
under the Federal Constitution without a chance to show either
party's interest if the law at issue is one of general applicability.33 7 A
substantial amount of precedent in New York and other states mili-
tates in favor of a balancing test, and even a compelling interest test,
in state free exercise jurisprudence.338 More generally, a claimant can
argue that the history and text of article I, section 3 mandate a higher
standard of review than is currently available under First Amendment
jurisprudence.3 3 9 Finally, the New York Constitution protects other
civil liberties more stringently than does the United States Constitu-
332 See AI-Amin v. City of New York, 979 F. Supp. 168, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
33 See id. at 171.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 See supra Part VI.B.
337 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Smith standard).
338 See supra Parts III, VIA.
339 See supra Parts II, IV.B, VI.B.
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tion, particularly in areas for which the Supreme Court has cut back
the scope of the federal rights.3 40 An individual who claims that the
state has intruded on her free exercise of religion should make these
arguments to persuade a New York court that the state must show a
compelling interest to burden her free exercise rights.
CONCLUSION
Religious liberty is enhanced by a constitutional analysis that bal-
ances the personal interest in free exercise of religion against the gov-
ernment's interests in restricting or imposing burdens upon religious
free exercise. 341 Individuals and groups whose religious beliefs and
practices do not coincide with those of the majority and who are polit-
ically powerless should be able to seek exemptions from those laws
that burden their ability to worship as they choose. Persons claiming
an exemption from a generally applicable law that allegedly violates
their free exercise of religion now find their claims under the First
Amendment foreclosed because of the Supreme Court decision in
Smith, which was reinstated as the federal free exercise standard in
F/ores. However, a person in New York seeking to challenge a state or
local law under the provisions of article I, section 3 will be able to
argue the strength of his interest against the countervailing state inter-
ests. In line with the history of free exercise in New York, the commit-
ment of the New York Court of Appeals to protecting other individual
liberties under the state constitution, and the trend of post-Smith juris-
prudence in those states with free exercise language resembling New
York's, a claimant most likely can force the state to show that it has a
compelling interest in burdening the claimant's free exercise of reli-
gion. Even a prisoner making a claim under the Rivera standard will
have his free exercise interest balanced against the state's interests
through a reasonableness test that involves genuine judicial inquiry.
Religious-exemption seekers in New York are more likely to succeed if
they bring their claims under the state constitution than if they do so
under the First Amendment.
340 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text; supra Part V.
341 See Carmella, supra note 34, at 325; Laycock, supra note 5, at 15; McConnell, supra
note 24, at 1152-53.
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